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Abstract
The notion of a class as manywas central to Bertrand Russells
early form of logicism in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics. There
is no empty class in this sense, and the singleton of an urelement (or
atom in our reconstruction) is identical with that urelement. Also,
classes with more than one member are merely pluralities or what
are sometimes called plural objects and cannot as such be them-
selves members of classes. Russell did not formally develop this notion
of a class but used it only informally. In what follows, we give a for-
mal, logical reconstruction of the logic of classes as many as pluralities
(or plural objects) within a fragment of the framework of conceptual
realism. We also take groups to be classes as many with two or more
members and show how groups provide a semantics for plural quanti-
er phrases.
There is more than one notion of a class that has been described in the
history of philosophy, and even the iterative concept of a set, which is the
best known development, is not univocal. The iterative concept of set can be
developed with an axiom of anti-foundation, for example, as well as with an
axiom of foundation.1 But in either case there can be no universal set, and
yet there are set theories, such as NF and NFU, in which there is a universal
set. Of course, the more traditional notions of a class were not based on
the iterative concept of set, but on classes as the extensions of concepts
(Begri¤sumfangen), and in fact this may be the best way to understand NF
and NFU.2 Classes were understood in this way in Freges Grundgetsetze, for
example; and although Freges theory was subject to Russells paradox, it can
1For a development of set theory with an anti-foundation axiom, see Aczel 1988.
2See Cocchiarella 1987, Chapter 4, for a defense of this view. For a description and
development of NFU, see Holmes 1998.
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be reconstructed in a consistent manner.3 Russells type theory, of course,
was based on a no-classesdoctrine, according to which all talk of classes
was to be explained away in terms of propositional functions, and hence it did
not really contain a theory of classes. Still, one can ignore Russells no-classes
doctrine and develop a type-theoretical version of set theory instead.
There is a notion of a class that has been ignored by most, but not all,
philosophers.4 This is the notion of a class as many, as described, e.g.,
by Bertrand Russell in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics.5 A class in this
sense is the extension of a common count noun, i.e., the extension of what
traditionally has been called a common name.6 The three important features
of this notion are, rst, that a vacuous common name, i.e., a common name
that names nothing, has no extension, which is not the same as having an
empty class as its extension. Thus, according to Russell, there is no such
thing as the null class, though there are null class-concepts, i.e., common-
name concepts that have no extension.7 Secondly, the extension of a common
name that names just one thing (in the sense of an urelement) is just that
one thing. In other words, unlike the singleton sets of set theory, which
are not identical with their single member, the class that is the extension
of a common name that names just one thing (urelement) is none other
than that one thing. This fact is related to our third point, namely, that
unlike sets, classes as the extensions of names are literally made up of their
members so that when they have more than one member they are in some
sense pluralities (Vielheiten), or plural objects, and not things that can
themselves be members of classes. Thus, according to Russell, though terms
3See, e.g., chapter 2 of Cocchiarella 1987.
4See, e.g., Simons 1982 for one proposed formulation of this notion. Simonss formu-
lation is di¤erent from the one we give here. Simons doubts that there can be an exact
logic for the quanticatory usesof common names, which is what the present system is
based on. Also, whereas the present system relies on only one type of objectualvariable
(having both atomsand classes as many as values), Simons has three: one for individ-
uals,another for pluralities,and a third for neutrals. There are a number of other
di¤erences as well, but we will not go into them here.
5See Russell 1903, chapter VI. Russells view in this book precedes his later no-classes
doctrine.
6Strictly speaking, Russell distinguishes between a common name, e.g., man, and its
plural form, men, and then takes the latter to denote the class as many of men (§67). We
do not distinguish common names from their plural forms here, and we describe the class
as many simply as the extension of the common name (and the concept it stands for).
7Russell 1903, §69.
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[i.e., objects] may be said to belong to ... [a] class, the class [as a plurality]
must not be treated as itself a single logical subject.8 For example, a
plurality of terms is not the logical subject when a number is asserted of
it: such propositions have not one subject, but many subjects, such as is
conveyed by A and Bor A and B and C, or any other enumeration of
denite terms.9 Sometimes we also speak of a class as many in this sense
i.e., when it has two or more members as a group, a practice we will adopt
here as well. Thus, e.g., it would seem to be the notion of a group, rather
than the more general notion of a class as many, that is the basis of the truth
conditions of sentences with plural quantier phrases, such as Peter Geachs
example of Some critics admire only each other, which can be rephrased as
There is a group of critics who admire only other members of the group.10
We believe that this notion of a class, or of a group, can be usefully de-
veloped as part of the broader framework of conceptual realism that we have
described elsewhere.11 The core of this framework is a second-order predi-
cate logic in which predicates can be nominalized and allowed to occur as
abstract singular terms. Nominalized predicates do not denote classes in this
framework, however, but intensional objects, sometimes also called prop-
erties and relations, which are object-ications of the truth conditions
determined by the concepts (cognitive structures) that predicates stand for
in their role as predicates and that underlie their rule-governed use in lan-
guage. We will not be concerned with the core part of this framework here,
however, but will restrict ourselves to an extension of the logic of names that
8Russell 1903, §70.
9Ibid., §§70 and 71. As a plurality, a class as many was understood by Russell to be an
object in a wider sense than termor individual, though he recognized that there were
grave logical problemsassociated with such a view (op. cit., p. 55). In our reconstruction
below, we take the notion of an object to be the same as that of an individual, though the
object-ication of a class as many as the extension of a nominal concept is ontologically
founded upon the conceptual mode of being of the concept, a fact that distinguishes classes
as many from, e.g., ordinary physical objects. As a plurality, a class as many is sometimes
also called a plural object.
10This sentence, or a variant of it, is sometimes referred to as the Geach-Kaplan example,
as, e.g., in Quine 1974, though where in Geachs or Kaplans publications it occurs is left
unspecied. Quine expressed the example as Some critics admire only one anotherand
claims that its analysis calls for quantication over classes(p. 111). (This reference was
pointed out to me by A. Hazen.) Of course, Quine meant by a class only a single object
(or class as oneas Russell described them) and not a plurality or plural object such as
Russells notion of a class as many.
11See, e.g., Cocchiarella 1996 for a description of conceptual realism as a formal ontology.
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is a central part of the theory of reference in conceptual realism. In particu-
lar, whereas names, both proper and common, and complex or simple, occur
as parts of quantier phrases in this theory, we propose that when these same
names are nominalized and allowed to occur as singular terms on a par with
individual variables, then, insofar as they can be taken as denoting anything
at all, their denotata can be taken to be classes as many, i.e., classes in the
sense indicated above.
1 Reference in Conceptual Realism
Reference in conceptual realism is a pragmatic notion in which both general
and singular reference is given a unied account based on the category of
names.12 This means that the category of names in the logic of this theory
contains symbolic counterparts of both proper and common names, i.e., both
proper and common nouns, including common noun phrases (such as house
that is brown, man who is wise, etc.). Common names are not restricted
to sortal common names, i.e., common names that have identity criteria
associated with their use (such as those just indicated), but include also such
common names as event, physical object, thing, thing that is green, etc.
Sortal common names are conceptually prior to common names in general,
and the logic of sortals is not unimportant in conceptualism.13 In fact, the
concept of a thing (object, individual, etc.) is initially constructed on the
basis of a thing of some sort or other.14 But that is not an issue that will
concern us here. We do restrict ourselves to the common names that are
count nouns, however. Also, we refer to names in general, whether proper
or common, complex or simple, as nominal expressions, and the concepts
expressed by names as nominal concepts.
Names, both proper and common, are di¤erent from predicate expres-
sions, as Peter Geach has pointed out, in that they can be used outside the
context of a sentence in simple acts of naming, which are semantically
di¤erent kinds of acts from assertions.15 In assertions, names are used in ref-
12See Cocchiarella 1998 for a more detailed description and defense of this theory of
reference.
13For an account of the logic of sortals, see Cocchiarella 1977 and Freund 2001. We might
also note that restricting nominal quantiers to sortal concepts is particularly appropriate
in A.I.
14See Sellars 1963, p. 253f, for precisely this sort of claim.
15See Geach 1980, p. 52. Naming is a pragmatic semiotical act that is also di¤erent
4
erential acts to refer to some, all, most, few, etc., of the things named, and
in conceptualism that use is represented by quantier phrases. An assertion
of Every man is mortal, for example, is symbolized in our conceptualist
theory as (8xMan)Mortal(x), or more simply as (8xA)F (x), where A is the
common name symbol for man, F represents the verb phrase is mortal,
and (8xA) stands for a referential act to every man. Proper names occurring
with an existential or universal quantier represent forms of singular refer-
ence with and without existential presuppositions respectively. Thus, e.g.,
an assertion of Socrates is mortal in which the referential act is with ex-
istential presupposition is symbolized as (9xB)F (x), where B is a symbolic
name for Socrates. An assertion of the same form, but without existential
presupposition, is symbolized as (8xB)F (x).
Referential acts can be deactivated,which is central to a conceptual-
realist account of intensional verbs, but we will not be concerned with that
part of the theory here.16 In other words, the conceptualist logic of names
that we will be concerned with here, and which we will call the simple logic of
names, is really only a fragment of the full theory of reference of conceptual
realism. It is of some interest in its own right, however, and in particu-
lar has been shown to provide an interpretation of Le´sniewskis system of
elementary ontology, which has also been called a logic of names.17 We ex-
tend that result here by showing how the extensions of nominal concepts can
be represented by nominalizing the names of this logic (whether proper or
common, complex or simple), i.e., by transforming them into singular terms,
the way mancan be transformed into mankind, which is di¤erent from
the transformation of humaninto humanity(or of the complex predicate
is a man, as represented by the -abstract [x(9yMan)(x = y)], into the
innitive or gerundive phrases to be a manand being a man).18 These
are two di¤erent types of nominalization, or transformations of nondenoting
expressions into denoting expressions, i.e., into singular terms (expressions
from referring; and both naming and reference are di¤erent from denotation, which is not
a pragmatic notion but a semantical one involved in characterizing the truth conditions
of sentences containing nominalized expressions.
16See Cocchiarella 1998 for an account of the deactivation of referential concepts.
17See Cocchiarella 2001, where it is also shown that the simple logic of names is equiv-
alent to second-order monadic predicate logic.
18See Sellars 1963 for another description of the di¤erence between these two forms of
nominalization. Russell, as already noted, did not use mankindbut the plural menas a
way of transforming maninto an expression that denotes the class as many of men, i.e.,
the class of men taken as a plurality.
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that can be substituted for free individual variables); and the kind of entity
that one denotes is di¤erent from the kind that the other denotes. Indeed,
one denotes an extensional entity whereas the other denotes an intensional
entity. Thus, according to Sellars, whereas S has (the property) whiteness
is the counterpart of S is white, S is a member of (the class) mankindis
the counterpart of S is a man.19 Similarly, according to Russell, whereas the
counterpart of Socrates is humanis Socrates has (the property) humanity,
the counterpart of Socrates is a manis Socrates is one among men, where
the plural menin the last sentence denotes, according to Russell, the class
as many of men, so that what the sentence says is that Socrates is a member
of the class (as many) of men.20 These di¤erent sentences express di¤erent,
but equivalent, propositions according to Russell, and the second in each pair
is derived from the rst, just as they are in conceptual realism.
What a nominalized name denotes, accordingly, is di¤erent from what a
nominalized predicate (adjective) denotes, and, as understood in conceptual
realism, the extensions of nominal concepts are essentially what Russell re-
ferred to as classes as many. There is one exception, of course; namely,
that whereas Russell took a class as many to be the extension only of a
common name, we take the extension (if any) of a proper name also to be
a class as many, but one that is identical with its single member. Thus,
when the proper name Socrates is nominalized, i.e., occurs as a singular
term and not as part of a quantier expression representing a referential act,
its extension is none other than Socrates himself, which of course is di¤er-
ent from the property of being Socrates as represented by the -abstract
[x(9ySocrates)(x = y)]. Similarly, whereas mankinddenotes the exten-
sion or class as many (collective totality) of humans, humanity, which is
the nominalization of the predicate human, denotes the property of being
human, which we take to be an intensional, abstract object, and not an
extensional object.21 As already noted, the full logic of conceptual realism
contains a logic of nominalized predicates, and hence an account of abstract
intensional objects (properties and relations-in-intension), but our goal here
19Sellars 1963, p. 253.
20Russell 1903, §68.
21The adjective human is sometimes taken as a common name when what is really
meant is human beingor thing that is human. In this sense every predicate F can be
transformed into a complex common name of the form thing that is F . Of course, the
class of human beings, or humankind, which is identical with mankind, is no way to be
confused with the property humanity
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is not to consider the full logic but to develop only the logic of nominalized
names, whether proper or common and complex or simple, as an account of
classes as many, i.e., classes in the collective sense.
2 The Simple Logic of Names
The simple logic of names (which, as we said, is a fragment of the full logic
of conceptual realism) can be described as a version of identity logic free of
existential presuppositions regarding (so-called) singular terms (i.e., free in-
dividual variables and expressions that can be properly substituted for such)
with both absolute and relative quantier phrases (such as (8xA) and (9xA))
binding individual variables as well as absolute quantiers binding nominal
variables. We use x; y; z; etc., with or without numerical subscripts, to refer
to individual variables, and A;B;C; with or without numerical subscripts, to
refer to name (nominal) variables.22 Complex names are formed by adjoining
(so-called dening) relative clauses to names. We use =, as in A='to
represent the adjunction of a formula ' to the name A (which may itself be
complex). Thus, e.g., the quantier phrase representing reference to a house
that is brown would be symbolized as (9xHouse=Brown(x)). We take the
universal quantier, 8, the (material) conditional sign,!, the negation sign,
:, and the identity sign, =, as primitive logical constants, and assume the
others to be dened in the usual (abbreviatory) way. The absolute quantier
phrases (8x) and (9x) are read as Everythingand Something(or Every
objectand Some object), i.e., as implicitly containing the most general or
ultimate common name thing(which we take to be synonymous with ob-
jectand individual). The quantier phrases (8A) and (9A) are taken as
referring to every or some nominal concept, respectively. Name constants are
introduced in particular applications of the logic.23
Because complex names contain formulas, names and formulas are in-
ductively dened simultaneously as follows24: (1) every name variable (or
constant) is a name; (2) for all individual variables x; y, (x = y) is a for-
mula; and if ';  are formulas, B is a name (complex or simple), and x and C
22We assume that there are denumerably many of both kinds of variables.
23The absolute quantiers and the quantiers for nominal concepts are in general un-
derstood to be relativized to a given universe of discourse in an applied form of the logic.
24We adopt the usual informal conventions for dropping parentheses and for sometimes
using brackets instead of parentheses.
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are an individual and a name variable respectively, then (3) :', (4) ('!  ),
(5) (8x)', (6) (8xB)', and (7) (8C)' are formulas, and (8) B=' and (9)
=' are names. We assume the usual denitions of bondage and freedom for
individual variables and of the proper substitution of one individual variable
(or singular term such as a nominalized nominal expression when such are
later added) for another in a formula, and similarly we assume the denitions
of bondage and freedom of occurrences of nominal variables in formulas, and
the proper substitution in a formula ' of a nominal variable (or constant) B
for free occurrences of a nominal variable C. A complex name B= is free for
C in ' with respect to an individual variable x (as place holder) if (1) for
each variable y such that (8yC) occurs in ' and C is free at that occurrence,
then y is free for x in B=, and (2) no variable, nominal or individual, other
than x that is free in B= becomes bound when a free occurrence of C in '
is replaced by an occurrence of B=(y=x).25 If a name B (complex or simple)
is free for C in ' with respect to a variable x, then the proper substitution
of B for C in ' with respect to x is represented by '(B[x]=C).
The axioms of the simple logic of names are those of the free logic of
identity plus the axioms for nominal quantiers:
Axiom 1: All tautologous formulas;
Axiom 2: (8x)['!  ]! [(8x)'! (8x) ];
Axiom 3: (8C)['!  ]! [(8C)'! (8C) ];
Axiom 4: (8C)'! '(B[x]=C), where B is free for C in ' with respect
to x;
Axiom 5: ! (8C), where C is not free in ;
Axiom 6: ! (8x), where x is not free in ;
Axiom 7: (8x)(9y)(x = y); where x; y are di¤erent variables;
Axiom 8: x = x;
Axiom 9: x = y ! ('!  ); where  is obtained from ' by replacing
one or more free occurrences of x by free
occurrences of y;
Axiom 10: (8xA)'$ (8x)[(9yA)(x = y)! ']; where x; y are di¤erent
25The use of =in (y=x)represents the result of properly substituting y for x in ,
and should not be confused with the use of =to generate complex names.
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variables;
Axiom 11: (8xA= )'$ (8xA)[ ! '].
We take modus ponens (MP) and universal generalization (UG) with
respect to an individual or a nominal variable as inference rules. The rule of
universal generalization for relative quantiers,
(UGN) if ` ', then ` (8xA)';
is derivable by (UG) from axiom 10. The usual laws for interchanging prov-
ably equivalent formulas and for rewriting bound variables are easily seen to
be derivable as well. The universal instantiation law in free logic for individ-
ual variables,
(9=UI) (9x)(x = y)! [(8x)'! '(y=x)];
where x; y are distinct variables and y is free for x in ', is derivable by
Leibnizs law (LL), i.e., axiom 9, (UG), axioms 2 and 6, and tautologous
transformations. The theorems that are counterparts to axioms 10 and 11
for the existential quantiers, namely,
T1: ` (9xA)'$ (9x)[(9yA)(x = y) ^ '],
and
T2: ` (9xA= )'$ (9xA)[ ^ ']
are also derivable by elementary transformations and the denitions for ^
and 9. Also, because absolute quantiers are viewed as implicitly containing
the common name thing, we assume that axiom 11 has the following schema
as a special instance.
T3: ` (8x= )'$ (8x)[ ! ']:
The following are some obvious theorems that are easily seen to be prov-
able.
T4: (8x)'! (8xA)':
T5: (8xA)'! [(9zA)(y = z)! '(y=x)], where y is free for x in ':
T6: (9xA)(y = x)! (9x)(y = x):
T7: (8x)'$ (8A)(8xA)'; where A is not free in ':
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Proof. The left-to-right direction follows by T4, (UGN), quantier laws.
The right-to-left direction follows by rst universally instantiating A to thing
identical to itself, i.e., =(x = x), so that by axiom 4 we have ` (8A)(8xA)'!
(8x=x = x)'; and, by T3, ` (8x=x = x)' ! (8x)[x = x ! ']; from which,
by axiom 8, (UG), and axioms 2 and 1, ` (8x=x = x)' ! (8x)'; and from
this the right-to-left direction of T7 follows.
3 On the Extensions of Names
We turn now to the nominalizationof names, i.e., the transformation of
names as parts of quantier phrases into singular terms, by which we mean
expressions that are substituends of free individual variables.26 Where A is
a name, proper or common, complex or simple, we take [x^A] also to be a
name, but one in which the variable x is bound. Thus, where A is a name
and ' is a formula, [x^A], [x^A='], and [x^='] are names in which all of the
free occurrences of x in A and ' are bound. We read these expressions as
the class (or group) of A, the class (or group) of A that are ', and the
class (or group) of things that are '. (We will speak of a class as many as
a group when there is more than one thing in the class.)
We assume the simultaneous inductive denition of names is now ex-
tended to include names of this form as well. That is, (1) every name vari-
able (or constant) is a name; (2) if a; b are either individual variables, name
variables (or constants), or names of the form [x^B], where x is an individual
variable and B is a name (complex or simple), then (a = b) is a formula; and
if ';  are formulas, B is a name (complex or simple), and x and C are an
individual and a name variable, respectively, then (3) :', (4) (' !  ), (5)
(8x)', (6) (8xB)', and (7) (8C)' are formulas, and (8) B=', (9) =', and
(10) [x^B] are names.
Note that by denition we now have formulas of the form (8y[x^A])', as
well as those of the form (8xA)' and (8yA(y=x))' as in §2. We reduce the
rst to the last of these forms by adding the following axiom schema to those
already listed in §2 (but now understood to apply to our extended notions
of name and formula)27:
26It should be noted that in free logic being a substituend of free individual variables
i.e., being a singular term is not the same as denoting a value of the bound individual
variables. That is, in free logic some singular terms may denote nothing.
27Axiom 12 is for names as parts of quantier phrases the analogue of -conversion for
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Axiom 12: (8y[x^A])'$ (8yA(y=x))'; where y does not occur in A.
Given our understanding of the existential quantier as dened in terms of
negation and the universal quantier, this means we also have the following
as a theorem (where y is free for x in A):
T8: ` (9y[x^A])'$ (9yA(y=x))':
Two other axioms about the occurrence of names as singular terms are:
Axiom 13: (9A)(A = [x^B]), where B is a name and A is a name variable
that does not occur (free) in B; and
Axiom 14: A = [x^A], where A is a simple name, i.e., a name
variable or constant.
It is noteworthy that our earlier axiom 4 is now redundant and can be
derived by the now extended version of Leibnizs law, (LL), and axiom
13. That is, by (LL), ` C = [x^B] ! [' ! '([x^B]=C)], and therefore by
(UG), axioms 3, 5, and tautologous transformations, ` (9C)(C = [x^B]) !
[(8C)'! '([x^B]=C)], and hence, by axiom 13,
T9: ` (8C)'! '([x^B]=C).
It should be noted that T9 is slightly stronger than axiom 4 in that it includes
cases in which complex names occur as singular terms, i.e., where some (or
all) of the occurrences of C in ' may be as singular terms, and hence where
not all occurrences of [x^B] in '([x^B]=C) can be replaced by B if B is a
complex name of the form A= or of the form = . If C occurs in ' only
as part of a quantier phrase, then '([x^B]=C) is equivalent to '(B=C) by
axiom 12.
We turn now to denitions of some of the concepts that are important in
the logic of classes. Although we adopt the same symbols that are used in
set theory to express membership, inclusion and proper inclusion, it should
be kept in mind that the present notion of class is not that of set theory.
Denition 1 x 2 y $ (9A)[y = A ^ (9zA)(x = z)].
Denition 2 x  y $ (8z)[z 2 x! z 2 y].
Denition 3 x  y $ x  y ^ y * x.
predicates.
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Russells paradox for classes does not lead to a contradiction within this
system as described so far, it should be noted. Rather, what it shows is that
the Russell class as many does not existin the sense of being the value of a
bound individual variable, which is not to say that the concept of the Russell
class does not have its own conceptual mode of being as a value of the bound
nominal variables. Indeed, as the following denition indicates, the nominal
concept of the Russell class can be dened in purely logical terms.
Denition 4 Rus = [x^=(9A)(x = A ^ x =2 A)].
That the Russell class does not exist(as a value of the bound individual
variables) is stated in the following theorem.28
T10: ` :(9x)(x = Rus).
Proof. By axiom 13 and identity logic, ` (9A)(Rus = A); and by den-
ition 1, ` Rus 2 Rus$ (9A)[Rus = A^ (9xA)(x = Rus)], and therefore by
Leibnizs law, a quantier-connement law and tautologous transformations,
` Rus 2 Rus$ (9xRus)(x = Rus). But then, by denition of Rus and T8,
` (9xRus)(x = Rus)$ (9x=(9A)(x = A^x =2 A))(x = Rus), and therefore,
by T1, ` (9xRus)(x = Rus)$ (9x)[(9A)(x = A ^ x =2 A) ^ x = Rus], from
which, by Leibnizs law, it follows that ` (9xRus)(x = Rus) $ (9x)[Rus =2
Rus ^ x = Rus]; and, accordingly, by quantier-connement laws, and tau-
tologous transformations, ` (9x)(x = Rus) ! (Rus 2 Rus $ Rus =2 Rus),
from which we conclude that ` :(9x)(x = Rus).
What Russells argument shows is that not every nominal concept has
an extension that can be object ied (in the sense of being the value of an
individual/object variable). The question arises, then, as to whether or not
we can specify a necessary and su¢ cient condition for when a nominal con-
cept has an extension that can be object ied, i.e., for when the extension
of the concept can be proven to exist(as the value of a bound individual
variable).29 In fact, the answer is a¢ rmative; i.e., unlike the situation in set
28That the Russell class as many does not exist as an object (i.e., as a value of the
bound individual variables) is important to note because Boolos and others claim that
the objective view of plural objects (such as classes as many) is refuted by Russells
paradox. (See, e.g., [Schein 1993], pages 5, 15, and 32-37.)
29By the object ication of the extension of a nominal concept we mean not only that
the extension exists (in the sense of being a value of the bound individual variables),
but also that the being of that extension as an object is founded upon that the (di¤erent
mode of) being of the nominal concept whose extension it is. In particular, the extension
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theory, such a condition can be specied for the notion of a class as many. An
important part of this condition is Nelson Goodmans notion of an atom,
which, although it was intended for a strictly nominalistic framework, we can
utilize for our purposes and dene as follows.30
Denition 5 Atom = [x^=:(9y)(y  x)].
This notion of an atom has nothing to do with physical atoms, of course.
Rather, it corresponds in our present system approximately to the notion of
an urelement in set theory. We say approximatelybecause in this system
atoms are identical with their singletons, and hence each atom will be a mem-
ber of itself. This means that not only are ordinary physical objects atoms
in this sense, but so are the propositions and intensional objects denoted
by nominalized sentences and predicates in the fuller system of conceptual
realism. The following axiom (where y does not occur in A) species when
and only when a nominal concept A has an extension that can be object ied
(as a value of the bound individual variables).
Axiom 15: (9y)(y = [x^A])$ (9xA)(x = x) ^ (8xA)(9zAtom)(x = z).
Stated informally, axiom 15 says that the extension of a nominal concept A
can be object ied (as a value of the bound individual variables) if, and only
if, something is an A and every A is an atom.31 An immediate consequence
of this axiom, and of T8 and T1, is the following theorem schema, which
stipulates exactly when an arbitrary condition 'x has an extension that can
be object ied.
T11: ` (9y)(y = [x^='x])$ (9x)'x ^ (8x='x)(9zAtom)(x = z).
Note that where 'x is the impossible condition (x 6= x), it follows from T11
that there can be no empty class, which, as already noted, is our rst basic
feature of the notion of a class as many. We dene the empty-class concept
could not exist (as an object) without the ontologically prior being (as a concept) of the
nominal concept whose extension it is.
30See Goodman 1956 for Goodmans account of atoms in nominalism.
31That something is anA is perspicuously symbolized by (9y)(9xA)(y = x). But because
(9xA)(x = x)$ (9y)(9xA)(y = x) is provable, we will use (9xA)(x = x) as a shorter way
of saying the same thing.
The referee for this paper has suggested that because A may have a dependency on x,
the conjunct (8xA)(9zAtom)(x = z) in Axiom 15 should be read as no non-atom a is an
A(a=x).
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as follows and then note that its extension, by T11, cannot exist (as a
value of the bound individual variables), as well as that no thing can belong
to it.
Denition 6  = [x^=(x 6= x)].
T12a: ` :(9x)(x = ).
T12b: ` :(9x)(x 2 .
Finally, our last axiom concerns the second basic feature of classes as
many; namely, that every atom (urelement) is identical with its singleton.
In terms of a nominal concept A, the axiom stipulates that if at most one
thing is an A and that whatever is an A is an atom, then whatever is an A
is identical to the extension of A, which in that case is a singleton if in fact
anything is an A. Where y does not occur in A, the axiom is as follows.
Axiom 16: (8xA)(8yA)(x = y) ^ (8xA)(9zAtom)(x = z)!
(8yA)(y = [x^A]).
A more explicit statement of the thesis that an atom is identical with its
singleton is given in the following theorem.
T13: ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! x = [y^=(y = x)].
Proof. Where A be the nominal concept thing-that-is-identical-to x, i.e.
=(y = x), then, by axiom 11 and (LL), ` (8y=y = x)(8w=w = x)(y =
w), and, similarly, ` (9zAtom)(x = z) ! (8y=y = x)(9zAtom)(y = z).
Therefore, by axiom 16, ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! (8y=y = x)(y = [y^=(y = x]).
But, by T6, ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! (9z)(z = x), and therefore by (9/UI), T3
and axiom 8, ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! x = [y^=(y = x].
By T13, it follows that every atom is identical with the extension of some
nominal concept, e.g., the concept of being that atom. Of course, non-atoms
are the extensions of nominal concepts as well (by the denitions of Atom,
, and 2), and hence anything whatsoever is the extension of a nominal
concept.
T14: ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! (9A)(x = A).
T15: ` :(9zAtom)(x = z)! (9A)(x = A).
T16: ` (9A)(x = A).
Note that if A is a proper name of an ordinary (physical) object (and
hence an atom), then the antecedent of axiom 16 is true, and therefore, by
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axioms 16 and 14, (8yA)(y = A). In other words, if A is a proper name
of an atom, then F (A) $ (8yA)F (y) is true32, which in our conceptualist
framework explains the role proper names have as singular terms(i.e., as
substituends of free individual variables) in free logic. Of course, if A is a
non-vacuous proper name of an ordinary object, then (9yA)(y = A) is true,
and hence F (A)$ (9yA)F (y) as true as well.
A consequence of T13, the denition of 2, T8, and Leibnizs law is the
thesis that every atom is a member of itself. A similar argument, but without
T13, shows that everything is a member of its singleton.
T17: ` (8xAtom)(x 2 x).
T18: ` (8x)(x 2 [z^=(z = x)]).
Finally, we note that by denition of membership and Leibnizs law an
object x can belong to the extension of a (nominal) concept A i¤ x is an
A. From this it follows that only atoms can belong to an object ied class as
many, and hence that classes as many that are not atoms are not themselves
members of any (real) classes as many, which is our third basic feature of
classes as many.
T19: ` x 2 A$ (9yA)(x = y).
T20a: ` (8x)[z 2 x! (9wAtom)(z = w)].
T20b: ` :(9wAtom)(z = w)! :(9x)(z 2 x).
Proof. By denition of 2, ` z 2 x ! (9A)[x = A ^ (9wA)(z = w)],
and therefore, by T6, ` z 2 x ! (9w)(z = w). By axiom 15, ` (9y)(A =
y)! (8zA)(9wAtom)(z = w); and therefore, by axiom 10, T19, and (LL),
` (9y)(x = y) ^ x = A ! (8z)[z 2 A ! (9wAtom)(z = w)]. But then, by
quantier-connement laws, T16, (LL), (9/UI) and elementary transforma-
tions, ` (9y)(x = y) ! [z 2 x ! (9wAtom)(z = w)]. Therefore, by (UG)
and axiom 7, ` (8x)[z 2 x! (9wAtom)(z = w)], which is T20a. T20b then
follows by a quantier-connement law and tautologous transformations.
We should perhaps emphasize here that T20b does not preclude classes
from being members of non-objectied classes as many, i.e., from classes
as many that are not real in the sense of being the value of a bound
32That is, by (UG), axioms 2 and 6, T4, a quantier-connement law, and Leibnizs
law,
(8yA)(y = A) ` F (A)$ (8yA)F (y):
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individual variable. As we will see in §5 below, everything real in this
sense is a member of the universal class, even though the universal class is
not itself real,i.e., cannot be objectied as a value of the bound individual
variables. That everything real is a member of the universal class means
only (by denition of 2) that everything real is self-identical.
4 Extensional Identity
The nominalists dictum,according to Nelson Goodman, is that no two
distinct things can have the same atoms.33 Such a dictum, it would seem,
should apply to classes as many (as traditionally understood), regardless
whether or not a more comprehensive framework containing such classes is
nominalistic or not. In fact, the dictum would be provable here if we were to
assume an axiom of extensionality for classes; but in that case we would be
committed to a strictly extensional framework even if it were not otherwise
nominalistic. That is, nominal concepts that have the same extension at a
given moment in a given possible world would then, by Leibnizs law, be
necessarily equivalent, and therefore have the same extension at all times in
every possible world. That is a consequence we do not want in our broader
framework of conceptual realism, which is an intensional logic that, in keep-
ing with our commonsense understanding of the world, contains a tense,
modal, and epistemic logic, and therefore is not an extensional framework.
Accordingly, we will not assume an axiom of extensionality here.34
Instead of strict identity, however, we can show that Goodmans nomi-
nalistic dictum holds for the weaker notion of extensional identity,which
is not in conict with our wider intensional framework. Actually, even in an
extensional framework where a tense, modal and epistemic logic are not as-
sumed, one does not need to assume anything more than extensional identity.
Of course, by things being extensionally identical, we mean in our present
context only that whatever is in the one is in the other.
Denition 7 (x =ex y)$ (8z)[z 2 x$ z 2 y].
33Goodman 1956, p. 21.
34We could of course modify Leibnizs law so that it is provable only for extensional
contexts and otherwise must be supplemented by certain special assumptions in order to
apply to temporal and intensional contexts. In that case an extensionality axiom need not
lead to undesirable consequences.
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Restated in terms of extensional identity, Goodmans nominalistic dictum
is that things that have the same atoms are extensionally the same. This
version of the dictum, as already noted, is provable in our present system.
T21: ` (8x)(8y)[(8zAtom)(z 2 x$ z 2 y)! x =ex y].
Proof. By T5, T20a, (UG), quantier-connement laws, and elementary
transformations, ` (8x)[(8zAtom)(z 2 x$ z 2 y)! (8z)(z 2 x! z 2 y)],
and similarly ` (8y)[(8zAtom)(z 2 x $ z 2 y) ! (z 2 y ! z 2 x)], from
which T21 follows.
Note that by T13 and the denition of 2, whatever belongs to an atom
is identical with that atom, and therefore atoms are extensionally identical
if, and only if, they are identical simpliciter.
T22: ` (8xAtom)[y 2 x! y = x].
T23: ` (8xAtom)(8yAtom)[x =ex y $ x = y].
Note also that by T21 (and other theorems) it follows that everything
(real), whether it is an atom or not, has an atom in it.
T24: ` (8x)(9zAtom)(z 2 x).
Proof. By T5 and T17, ` (9zAtom)(x = z) ! (9zAtom)(z 2 x),
and hence, by contraposition and the denition of Atom, ` :(9zAtom)(z 2
x) ! :(9z[x^:(9y)(y  x)])(x = z); and therefore, by axioms 12, 11 and
elementary transformations, ` :(9zAtom)(z 2 x)! (8z)[x = z ! (9y)(y 
z)], from which, by (LL) and a quantier-connement law, it follows that
` :(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ! [(9z)(x = z) ! (9y)(y  x)]; and therefore, by
(UG) and axioms 2 and 7, ` (8x)[:(9zAtom)(z 2 x)! (9y)(y  x)]. Now,
by denition of , ` :(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ^ y  x ! :(9zAtom)(z 2 y),
and therefore ` :(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ^ y  x ! (8zAtom)[z 2 x $ z 2 y],
and, accordingly by (UG) and T21, ` (8x)(8y)[:(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ^ y 
x ! x =ex y]. But then, by denition of , ` (8x)(8y)[:(9zAtom)(z 2
x) ! (y  x ! x  y ^ x * y)]; and therefore, by quantier logic, `
(8x)[:(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ! :(9y)(y  x)]. Together with the above result,
this shows that ` (8x)[:(9zAtom)(z 2 x) ! (9y)(y  x) ^ :(9y)(y  x)],
from which T24 follows by quantier logic,.
Another useful theorem is the following, which, together with T21, shows
that every non-atom must have at least two atoms as elements. Of course,
conversely, any real class (as many) that has at least two members cannot be
an atom (because each of those members is properly contained in that class).
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T25: ` (8x)(8y)(y  x! (9zAtom)[z 2 x ^ z =2 y]).
Proof. By quantier logic and denition of , ` y  x! (8zAtom)(z 2
y ! z 2 x), and therefore, by (UG) and T21, ` (8x)(8y)(y  x !
[(8zAtom)(z 2 x ! z 2 y) ! x =ex y]). But then, by denition of 
and =ex, ` (8x)(8y)(y  x! [(8zAtom)(z 2 x! z 2 y)! x  y^x * y]),
and hence ` (8x)(8y)(y  x! (9zAtom)[z 2 x ^ z =2 y]).
T26: ` (8x)[:(9yAtom)(x = y)$ (9z1=z1 2 x)(9z2=z2 2 x)(z1 6= z2)].
Proof. By T25, ` (8x)(8y)(y  x! (9z1Atom)[z1 2 x^z1 =2 y]), and by
T24 and (9/UI), ` (9w)(y = w) ! (9z2Atom)(z2 2 y). But, by (LL) and
denition of , ` y  x^z1 =2 y^z2 2 y ! z2 2 x^z1 6= z2, and therefore, by
quantier logic, ` (9w)(y = w)! (8x)[y  x! (9z1Atom)(9z2Atom)(z1 6=
z2 ^ z1 2 x ^ z2 2 x)]. Accordingly, by (UG), axiom 7, T1 and quantier
logic, ` (8x)[(9y)(y  x)! (9z1Atom=z1 2 x)(9z2Atom=z2 2 x))(z1 6= z2)].
But, by quantier logic and denition of Atom, ` (8x)[:(9yAtom)(x = y)!
(9y)(y  x)], from which the left-right-direction of T26 follows. The converse
direction is of course trivial for the reason already noted.
Finally, let us note that there is an alternative to the axiom of extension-
ality that does not have the undesirable consequence that classes are strictly
identical if as a matter only of contingent fact they are extensionally identi-
cal. In particular, instead of an axiom of extensionality, we can assume a rule
to the e¤ect that if classes are provably extensionally identical, then they are
strictly identical. Of course, if it is provable that classes are extensionally
identical, then it is also necessary that they are extensionally identical, and
therefore, at least on this account, identical simpliciter. The rule in question
can be stated as follows.
(Ext7!Id) If ` (x =ex y); then ` x = y:
One immediate consequence of (Ext7!Id) is the derived rule that for-
mulas that are provably equivalent have the same classes as many as their
extensions.
(Ext7!Id2) If ` (8x)('$  ), then ` [x^='] = [x^= ].
Proof. Assume ` (8x)('$  ), and let y; z be distinct variables that are
free for x in ' and  . Then, by denition of 2, ` z 2 [x^=']$ (9A)([x^='] =
A ^ (9yA)(z = y)), and therefore, by (LL) and T8, ` z 2 [x^='] $
(9y='(y=x))(z = y), and hence, by T2, ` z 2 [x^=']$ (9y)('(y=x)^ z = y);
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and therefore, by assumption and interchange, ` z 2 [x^=']$ (9y)( (y=x)^
z = y). But then, by the same reasoning, ` z 2 [x^= ]$ (9y)('(y=x) ^ z =
y), from which, by (UG), it follows that ` [x^='] =ex [x^= ], and therefore, by
(Ext7!Id), ` [x^='] = [x^= ].
Two other consequences of (Ext7!Id) are the strict identity of a class
with the class of it members and the rewrite of bound variables for class
expressions.35
T27a: ` x = [z^=(z 2 x)].
T27b: ` [x^A] = [y^A(y=x)], where y does not occur in A.
Proof. By (9/UI), T2, and (LL), ` (9y)(z = y) ! [z 2 x ! (9y=y 2
x)(z = y)], and therefore, by T8 and T19, ` (9y)(z = y) ! (z 2 x ! z 2
[z^=(z 2 x)]), and hence, by axiom 7, ` (8z)(z 2 x ! z 2 [z^=(z 2 x)]).
For the converse direction, by T19, (LL), and T8, ` z 2 [z^=(z 2 x)] !
(9y=y 2 x)(z = y); and hence ` z 2 [z^=(z 2 x)] ! z 2 x. Therefore,
` x =ex [z^=(z 2 x)], and hence, by (Ext7!Id), ` x = [z^=(z 2 x)]. The proof
that ` [x^A] =ex [y^A(y=x)] follows from the denition of 2 and the rewrite
rule for relative quantiers, and T27b then follows by (Ext7!Id).
5 The Universal Class
We have seen that, unlike the situation in set theory, the empty class (as
many) does not exist (as a value of the bound individual variables). But
what about the universal class? In ZF set theory there is no universal set,
but in NF and NFU there is. In our present theory, the situation is more
complicated. For example, if nothing exists, then of course the universal class
does not exist. But, in addition, because something exists only if an atom
does, i.e., by T24 and (9/UI),
T28: ` (9x)(x = x)! (9xAtom)(x = x),
it follows that the universal class does not exist if there are no atoms
which is unlike the situation in set theory where classes exist whether or
not there are any urelements. As it turns out, we can also show that the
universal class does not exist if there are at least two atoms. If there is just
one atom, however, the situation is more problematic. First, let us dene
35In case we decide not to assume the rule (Ext 7!Id) in any given application of the
logic, we will place a star () after every theorem for which it is assumed.
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the universal class in the usual way, i.e., as the extension of the (nominal)
concept of being a thing that is self-identical, and then note that whether or
not the universal class can be objectied (as a value of the bound individual
variables), nevertheless, everything real (in the sense of being the value
of a bound individual variable) is in it. Despite appearances, it should be
emphasized, all that T29 really says is that everything is a thing that is
self-identical.
Denition 8 V = [x^=(x = x)].
T29: ` (8x)(x 2 V ).
Proof. By axiom 8, ` (8x)(9y)(x = y)$ (8x)(9y)(y = y ^ x = y), and
therefore, by T2, ` (8x)(9y)(x = y) $ (8x)(9y=y = y)(x = y), from which
T29 follows by T8, T19 and the denition of V .
Now, by denition of 2, nothing can belong to the empty class, i.e., x =2 ,
and therefore, by Leibnizs law, if anything at all exists, the universal class
is not the empty class.
T30: ` (9x)(x = x)! V 6= .
But it does not follow that the universal class exists if anything does. Indeed,
as already noted above, we can show that if there are at least two atoms, then
the universal class does not exist. First, let us note that if something exists
(and hence, by T28, there is an atom), then the class of atoms exists, i.e.,
then the class of atoms can be object ied (as a value of the bound individual
variables).
T31: ` (9x)(x = x)! (9y)(y = Atom).
Proof. By axiom 15, ` (9xAtom)(x = x) ^ (8xAtom)(9yAtom)(x =
y)! (9y)(y = Atom), from which, by T28 and quantier logic, T31 follows.
On the other hand, let us also note that if at least two atoms exist, then the
class of atoms is not itself an atom.
T32: ` (9xAtom)(9yAtom)(x 6= y)! :(9zAtom)(z = Atom).
Proof. By denition of 2, T8, and elementary transformations, ` x 6=
y ! x =2 [z^=(z = y)] ^ y =2 [z^=(z = x)], and therefore, by T13 and (LL),
` (9zAtom)(x = z) ^ (9zAtom)(y = z) ^ (x 6= y) ! x =2 y ^ y =2 x. By
T20a, ` (9zAtom)(x = z) ! x  Atom, and, by T19, ` (9zAtom)(y =
z) ! y 2 Atom. Therefore, by denition of , ` (9zAtom)(x = z) ^
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(9zAtom)(y = z) ^ y =2 x ! x  Atom, and hence ` (9zAtom)(x = z) ^
(9zAtom)(y = z) ^ (x 6= y) ! x  Atom. But, by denition of Atom,
` (8x)(8y)[x  y ! :(9zAtom)(z = y)], and hence, by T31, T6, and (9/UI),
` (9zAtom)(x = z) ^ x  Atom ! :(9zAtom)(z = Atom). Therefore,
` (9xAtom)(9yAtom)(x 6= y)! :(9zAtom)(z = Atom).
By means of T32, we can now show that if there are at least two atoms,
then the universal class does not exist (as a value of the individual variables).
T33: ` (9xAtom)(9yAtom)(x 6= y)! :(9x)(x = V ).
Proof. Note that by T20a and (9/UI), ` (9x)(x = V ) ! (8x)[x 2
V ! (9yAtom)(x = y)]. But, by axiom 8, (UG), and axioms 2 and 6,
` (9x)(x = V ) ! (9x)(x = x), and hence, by T31 and (9/UI), ` (9x)(x =
V )! [Atom 2 V ! (9yAtom)(y = Atom)]. But, by T31, T29, and (9/UI),
` (9x)(x = V ) ! Atom 2 V , and hence, ` (9x)(x = V ) ! (9yAtom)(y =
Atom). Accordingly, by T32, ` (9xAtom)(9yAtom)(x 6= y) ! :(9x)(x =
V ).
Finally, in regard to the question of whether or not the universal class
exists if the universe consists of just one atom, note that if that were in fact
the case, then, where A is a proper name of the one atom, the conjunction
(9zAtom)(z = A) ^ (8zAtom)(z = A) would be true, and therefore the one
atom A would be extensionally identical with the class of atoms, i.e., then, by
T31 and T21, (A =ex Atom) would be true as well. Now, by T29 and T19,
(8zAtom)[z 2 Atom $ z 2 V ] is provable, which, by T21 might suggest
that (Atom =ex V ) and hence that (A =ex V ) are true as well. But in
order for T21 to apply in this case we need to know that V exists, i.e., that
(9x)(x = V ) is true. So, even if there were just one atom, we still could
not conclude that the universal class is extensionally identical with that one
atom. In any case, note that even if (A =ex V ) were true, and we assumed an
axiom of extensionality, so that (A = V ) were true as well, then, by Leibnizs
law, the universal class would then both exist and be an atom. That would
exclude the possibility that two or more atoms had existed in the past, or
in general that there could have been more than one atom, a situation that
should not be excluded on logical grounds alone.
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6 Intersection, Union, and Complementation
Let us turn now to the Boolean operations of intersection, union and comple-
mentation for classes as many. We adopt the following standard denitions
of each.
Denition 9 x [ y = [z^=z 2 x _ z 2 y].
Denition 10 x \ y = [z^=(z 2 x ^ z 2 y)].
Denition 11 x = [z^=z =2 x].
The following theorems regarding membership in the union and intersec-
tion of classes are consequences of T19 and T8. The proof of the theorem
regarding membership in the complement of a class is slightly more involved.
T34: ` (8z)(z 2 x [ y $ z 2 x _ z 2 y).
T35: ` (8z)(z 2 x \ y $ z 2 x ^ z 2 y).
T36: ` (8z)(z 2 x$ z =2 x).
Proof. By denition of 2, ` z 2 x $ (9A)[x = A ^ (9yA)(z = y)], and
therefore, by (LL) and T8, ` z 2 x! (9y=y =2 x)(z = y), and hence, by T2
and (LL), ` z 2 x ! z =2 x. For the converse direction, note that by T2
and (LL), ` (9y)(z = y) ^ z =2 x ! (9y=y =2 x)(z = y), and therefore, by
the denitions of 2 and x, ` (9y)(z = y) ! [z =2 x ! z 2 x], and hence by
(UG) axioms 2 and 7, and elementary logic, ` (8z)(z =2 x! z 2 x).
Two immediate consequences of T36 (together with T12b and T29) are
that the empty class is extensionally identical with the complement of the
universal class, and that the universal class is extensionally identical with the
complement of the empty class; and, therefore, by (Ext7!Id), it then follows
that each extensional identity reduces to identity simpliciter.
T37a: `  =ex V .
T37b: `  = V .
T38a: ` V =ex .
T38b: ` V = .
In regard to the conditions for the existence of unions and intersections,
we rst prove a theorem that is useful in their respective proofs.
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T39: ` (8x)[(9z)(z 2 x) ^ (8z=z 2 x)(9wAtom)(z = w)].
Proof. By T6, (9/UI), (LL), and T17, ` (9zAtom)(x = z)! (9z)(z 2
x), and, by T26, ` (8x)[:(9zAtom)(x = z) ! (9z)(z 2 x)]; hence, `
(8x)(9z)(z 2 x). But then T39 follows by T20a and quantier logic.
T40: ` (8x)(8y)(9z)(z = x [ y).
Proof. By T39 (twice), ` (8x)[(9z)(z 2 x) ^ (8z=z 2 x)(9wAtom)(z =
w)] and ` (8y)[(9z)(z 2 y) ^ (8z=z 2 y)(9wAtom)(z = w)], and therefore,
by quantier logic, ` (8x)(8y)[(9z)(z 2 x _ z 2 y) ^ (8z=z 2 x _ z 2
y)(9wAtom)(z = w)]. Accordingly, by T11, ` (8x)(8y)(9z1)(z1 = [z^=(z 2
x _ z 2 y)]), from which T40 follows by denition of union.
The related theorem for intersection requires a qualication, because some
intersections (e.g., of distinct atoms) are empty, and, the empty class (as
many) does not exist. Clearly, the relevant qualication is that the classes
being intersected have a member in common.
T41: ` (8x)(8y)[(9z)(z 2 x ^ z 2 y)! (9z)(z = x \ y)].
Proof. By T39 (twice) and elementary logic, ` (8x)(8y)(8z=z 2 x ^
z 2 y)(9wAtom)(z = w)], and therefore, by T11 and the denition of \,
` (8x)(8y)[(9z=z 2 x ^ z 2 y)! (9z)(z = x \ y)].
In regard to the existence of the complement of a class as many, we rst
note that if some atom is not in x, and therefore, by T36, is in x, then the
class as many of atoms in x exists, i.e., then [z^Atom=(z 2 x)] exists (as a
value of the bound individual variables). This result cannot be shown for x
alone, however, because, e.g., where x = , then, by T38b, x = V , in which
case x does not exist, or at least not if there exist two or more atoms. Also, in
that case [z^Atom=(z 2 x)] = Atom, and therefore, by T28, [z^Atom=(z 2 x)]
exists even though x does not.
T42: ` (9zAtom)(z =2 x)! (9y)(y = [z^Atom=(z 2 x)]).
Proof. By axiom 15, ` (9zAtom)(z 2 x)^(8zAtom=z 2 x)(9wAtom)(z =
w) ! (9y)(y = [z^Atom=(z 2 x)]); but, by axiom 11 and quantier logic, `
(8zAtom=z 2 x)(9wAtom)(z = w), and therefore, by T36, ` (9zAtom)(z =2
x)! (9y)(y = [z^Atom=(z 2 x)]).
Note that we can show that an atom is in [z^Atom=(z 2 x)] i¤ it is in x, but
we cannot use this result (T43 below) to prove that x exists if [z^Atom=(z 2
x)] exists. In particular, we cannot use T21 to prove [z^Atom=(z 2 x)] =ex x
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unless we already know that both classes exist. And even given their exten-
sional identity we still cannot prove their strict identity, because the exten-
sionality rule (Ext7!Id) requires that their extensional identity be unquali-
ed. We give below the results that do hold here.
T43: ` (8zAtom)(z 2 [z^Atom=z =2 x]$ z 2 x).
Proof. By T19, ` (9yAtom=y =2 x)(z = y) ! z 2 [y^Atom=y =2 x]; and,
by T19 and T36, ` (8zAtom)(z 2 [y^Atom=y =2 x]! z 2 x). For the converse
direction, by T36 and T2, ` (8zAtom)[z 2 x ! (9yAtom=y =2 x)(z = y)],
and therefore, by T19, ` (8zAtom)(z 2 x! z 2 [y^Atom=y =2 x]).
T44: ` (9y)(y = [z^Atom=z =2 x]) ^ (9y)(y = x)! [z^Atom=z =2 x] =ex x.
Proof. By T43, T21, and (9/UI).
7 Groups and Plural Reference
One of the uses of a logic of classes as many, as already noted, is that we
can represent in a natural and intuitive way the truth conditions of sentences
with plural quantier phrases. We suggested, for example, that the sentence
Some critics admire only each othercan also be read as There is group of
critics who admire only each other. Now, if by a group we meant only a
class as many, then the logical form of this sentence would be as follows:36
(9x=x  [y^Critic])(8y=y 2 x)(8z)[Admire(y; z)! z 2 x ^ z 6= y].
The group of critics being posited in this formula cannot be empty, be-
cause there is no empty class as many. On the other hand, the formula
does not exclude the possibility that the group of critics in question has
only one member and hence is identical with that one member who ad-
mires no one, and who therefore vacuously satises the condition (8y=y 2
x)(8z)[Admire(y; z)! z 2 x^z 6= y]. Such a possibility does not seem to be
part of the content of this sentence, i.e., one of the possible contexts in which
it might be truthfully asserted; and that is because part of the content of a
plural quantier phrase is that the group referred to consists of more than
one object. To remedy this we will assume that the common name group
can be used to refer only to a class as many that has a proper subclass, i.e.,
36This formulation is the counterpart in terms of classes as many of the version in terms
of second-order monadic predicate logic in Boolos 1984, p. 432.
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a class as many that is not an atom, and hence that every group has at least
two elements (as in T45).
Denition 12 Grp = [x^=(9y)(y  x)].
T45: ` (8xGrp)(9z1=z1 2 x)(9z2=z2 2 x)(z1 6= z2).
We can now symbolize the sentence Some critics admire only each other
in terms of a group of critics instead of just a class as many of critics as
above; that is, assuming the above formulation was correct except for this
di¤erence, we can symbolize the sentence as follows:
(9xGrp=x  [y^Critic])(8y=y 2 x)(8z)[Admire(y; z)! z 2 x ^ z 6= y].
This formulation may also be somewhat problematic, however.37 Consider,
for example, a group x of three critics A, B, and C satisfying the following
conditions: (1) A admires B but does not admire anyone else, (2) B admires
A and C but does not admire anyone else, and (3) C admires A but does not
admire anyone else. Then x = [y^(y = A _ y = B _ y = C)]  [y^Critic] and
(8y=y 2 x)(8z)[Admire(y; z) ! z 2 x ^ z 6= y] are true, and yet it seems
counter-intuitive to claim that x is a group of critics who admire only each
other. What else is needed, apparently, is the claim that distinct members of
x admire each other; that is, that the following is a more appropriate analysis
of the Geach sentence38:
(9xGrp=x  [y^Critic])[(8y=y 2 x)(8z=z 2 x)(y 6= z ! Admire(y; z)) ^
(8y=y 2 x)(8z)(Admire(y; z)! z 2 x ^ z 6= y)].
Another referential expression that is used to refer to groups in this sense
is the plural the, as in the inhabitants of Londonand the sons of rich men.
These examples are from Russells Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,
where Russell makes it clear that the references are to classes even though
37I owe the following counter-example to Randall Holmes.
38In English, this says that there is a group of critics who admire each other and only
each other. Whether or not this is the preferred reading of the original sentence depends
on how one understands the use of only in the context in which the sentence is used.
That is, some (but not all) uses of onlyintend a conjunction, as, e.g., in saying A loves
only Bone means A loves B and only B. But in Only the brave deserve the fair, we do
not intend to mean All and only the brave deserve the fair. The Geach sentence seems
to be more like the latter.
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he no longer accepts the notion of a class as a primitive idea.39 On our
reading these expressions are to be taken as referring to the inhabitants of
London as a group and similarly to the sons of rich men as a group. The
plural thecan in this way be reduced to the singular the, i.e., to a denite
description of a group.
Now, in conceptualism, the singular theis represented by a quantier (as
are all determiners), e.g., 91, where the truth conditions of an assertion of the
form The A is Fare spelled out in essentially the Russellian manner (when
the denite description is used with existential presupposition).40 That is,
although The A is F is symbolized as (91xA)F (x), where (91xA) stands
for a referential act (in which one purports to refer to a unique A) and F (x)
a predicable act whose mutual exercise in a speech or mental act results
in an assertion of the type in question, the truth conditions of that act are
perspicuously given in the following theorem of the background framework:41
` (91xA)F (x)$ (9xA)[(8yA)(y = x) ^ F (x)]:
Similarly, although The A that is F is Gis symbolized as (91xA=F (x))G(x),
its truth conditions are given as follows:
` (91xA=F (x))G(x)$ (9xA)[(8yA)(F (y)$ y = x) ^G(x)]:
Consider now the sentence The Greeks who fought at Thermopylae are
heroes, which we take to be equivalent to The group of Greeks who fought
at Thermopylae are heroes. Using F (x) for the verb phrases x fought at
Thermopylae, we can symbolize the sentence as follows:
(91xGrp=x = [x^Greek=F (x)])(8y=y 2 x)(9zHero)(y = z):
39Russell 1919, p.181. Plural descriptions are also taken in this way in Simons 1982, p.
227.
40In conceptualism, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish the logical form representing
the cognitive structure of a speech or mental act from the logical form that represents its
truth conditions in the most perspicuous way but where the connection between the two
may be made explicit by meaning postulates or other principles. This, in fact, is the case
with the use of denite descriptions. See Cocchiarella 1989, §6, for a fuller discussion of
this distinction.
41Again, we are assuming that the denite description is being used with existential
presuppositions. When the denite description is used without such presuppositions, it is
symbolized as (81xA)F (x) and its truth conditions are as follows:
` (81xA)F (x)$ (8xA)[(8yA)(y = x)! F (x)].
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The truth conditions of this sentence, as noted above, amount to there being
(now, at the time of the assertion) exactly one group of Greeks who fought
at Thermopylae and every member of that group is a hero, which captures
the intended content of the sentence in question.42 We might also note that
another standard formulation of the English sentence, namely, that the class
as many of Greeks who fought at Thermopylae is contained within the class
as many of heroes,
[x^Greek=F (x)]  [x^Hero];
is a consequence of the above formulation; and, in fact, if it is assumed that
[x^Greek=F (x)] has at least two members and that each of its members is an
atom, then the two formulations are equivalent to one another.
Finally, there are also the kind of plural references we noted earlier from
Russells Principles of Mathematics, e.g., A and B and C are three (things)
or A and B are (at least) two of Cs suitors, where A; B; and C are non-
vacuous proper names. Russell did not include the parenthetical (things)
and (at least)as we have, but these are really implicit in the examples.43
The numerical phrases in question here are really quantier phrases of the
form (93x) or (93xThing), where the common name thingis made explicit
in the symbolism and (92minxD), where D is a common-name symbol for
suitor of C. The sentence form, At least two D are F, symbolized as
(92minxD)F (x), is equivalent to the following more perspicuous representation
of its truth conditions,
` (92minxD)F (x)$ (9xD)(9yD)[x 6= y ^ F (x) ^ F (y)];
and, of course, (Exactly) two D are Fis equivalent to the following
` (92xD)F (x)$ (9xD)(9yD)[x 6= y ^F (x)^F (y)^ (8zD)(z = x_ z = y)]:
The sentence A and B are (at least) two D, which we assume is equivalent
to The group consisting of A and B has at least two members, can now be
42This reading does not exclude the possibility of there being another di¤erent group of
Greeks in the future who will have fought at Thermopylae that might falsify the assertion.
43A common name, even if only the name thing, is always implicit in the use of a
numerical quantier phrase, as, e.g., in three books, at least two men, three things,
etc. In regard to the parenthetical (at least), note that Russells example is Brown and
Jones are two of Miss Smiths suitors(op. cit., §59), where it does not seem that Russell
meant to imply that Miss Smith has only two suitors; otherwise the sentence should have
been phrased slightly di¤erently.
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symbolized as
(91xGrp=x = [y^=(y = A _ y = B)])(92minzD)(z 2 x);
which, given the assumption that A and B are non-vacuous proper names44
of distinct atoms, is equivalent to45
(92minzD)(z 2 [y^=(y = A _ y = B)]):
The truth conditions of the sentence A and B and C are three (things),
which we assume is equivalent to The group consisting of A and B and C
has three members, can similarly be perspicuously represented as
(91xGrp=x = [y^=(y = A _ y = B _ y = C)])(93z)(z 2 x);
which, given the assumption that A, B, and C are non-vacuous proper names
of distinct atoms, is equivalent to
(93z)(z 2 [y^=(y = A _ y = B _ y = C)]):
Now although these quantier phrases are the basic kinds of ways by
which we speak of di¤erent numbers of things, the natural numbers can
also be expressed as predicable concepts of classes as many and then, by
nominalization, as abstract objects (concept-correlates) in their own right
(i.e., as propertiesof classes as many).46 The number three, for example,
44It should be kept in mind that non-vacuous proper names, when nominalized, behave
in our present system just the way they do in so-called standard rst-order predicate logic.
That is why (y = A _ y = B) is well-formed and meaningful in our system.
45We note again that we are concerned here with a perspicuous representation of the
truth conditions of the sentence in question, and not with a logical representation of it
cognitive structure. The latter can be given as
(9xA ^ 9yB)[xy(92minzD)(z = x _ z = y)](x; y);
where the conjunctive nominal phrase (9xA^9yB) is represented in the fuller framework
of conceptual realism.
46We di¤er here from Russells 1910 view of numbers as properties of properties, which
was the way they were dened in [Cocchiarella 1989], §4. Note that on our present analysis,
0 = [x(9A)(x = A ^ :(9yA)(y = y)];
i.e., zero is the property that nothing has (because there is no empty class), which is
unlike our earlier analysis where zero is a property of properties that nothing has, i.e., a
property that many things (properties) have.
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can be dened (in the fuller framework of conceptual realism) as that concept
under which fall all and only those classes as many that have three members,
i.e.,
3 = [x(9A)(x = A ^ (93xA)(x = x)]:
The sentence, The group consisting of A and B and C has three members,
which given the assumption that A, B, and C are non-vacuous proper names
of distinct atoms, can then also be symbolized as
3([y^=(y = A _ y = B _ y = C)]):
The logic of classes as many is more than a museum piece in logical and
ontological analysis, we maintain. It provides an explication of a useful notion
of classes other than that of sets (with or without a universal set, with or
without an axiom of foundation, etc.), even if only for purposes of comparison
regarding what it means for a class or set to have its being in its members.
More importantly, it captures a notion that is basic to our commonsense
understanding of groups of things, i.e., plural objects, and provides in this
regard a natural semantics for many forms of plural reference. These kinds of
references are a critical part of a proper understanding of our commonsense
framework.
8 Appendix 1: A Set-Theoretic Semantics
A set-theoretical semantics can be constructed for the logic of classes as
many as formalized here, and the system can be shown to be consistent
with respect to that construction. We will forego the proofs in what follows
and just sketch out the semantics for a standard model of the system
without indices (possible worlds, moments of time, contexts of use, etc.),
and therefore one in which the axiom of extensionality is valid. Extending
this semantics to one that includes indices, and hence to one in which the
axiom of extensionality is not valid, is unproblematic and can be done in the
usual way.
By an (object) language we understand a (possibly empty) set of predicate
and nominal constants. We will take 2, , , and Atomdened in
the logic of classes as primitive logical constants with their denitions as
additional axioms of the logic. This means that the notion of a formula
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must be extended to include atomic formulas consisting of n-place predicate
constants applied to n many singular terms, for n 2 !.47
Denition 13 L is a language i¤ L is a countable set of nominal constants
(proper and common names) and predicate constants.
By a set of atomswe understand a set that does not have the empty set
as a member and no member of which has a member in common with that
set. The idea is that atomsare to function as urelements. Thus, where D
is any nonempty set, the set fhd;Di : d 2 Dg is a set of atoms even if D is
not.
Denition 14 D is a set of atomsi¤ D is a set such that 0 =2 D and for
each d 2 D, d \D = 0.
A standardmodel for a language consists of a set, possibly empty, of
atoms, i.e., objects considered as urelements with respect to the various
sets that make up the model, and an assignment of extensions to the predicate
and nominal constants. The assignment to the constants is not drawn just
from the set D of atoms, however, but from an extended set D+ dened as
follows.
Denition 15 If D is a set (of atoms), then D+ = D [ fX  D : X 6= 0
and for all d 2 D, X 6= fdgg.
We dene the denotation function with respect to a set D as follows.
Denition 16 If D is a set (empty or otherwise), then the denotation func-
tion of D, in symbols, denD, is that function with D [ fX : X  D+g as
domain and such that
(1) for all d 2 D, denD(d) = d, and
(2) for all X  D+,
denD(X) =

d, if X = fdg; for some (atom) d 2 D
X otherwise
.
47We assume our metalanguage to be ZF set theory, and we take ! to be the set of
natural numbers, where for each n 2 !, n is the set of natural numbers less than n. Thus
0 is the empty set.
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We now dene the notion of a standardnominal model.
Denition 17 A is a nominal L-model i¤ L is a language and there are a
set D, possibly empty, of atomsand a relation R such that
(1) A = hD;Ri; and
(2) R is a function with L as domain and such that for each nominal constant
A 2 L, R(A)  D+, and for each n 2 !, and each n-place predicate constant
 2 L, R() is a set of n-tuples drawn from D+.
Note that because R(A)  D+, where A is a nominal constant, then
names of single atoms are assigned singletons of those atoms, and not the
atoms themselves. This is corrected forin the denition of the denotation
function in a model, which, in the standard semantics, we identify with
the denotation function of the domain of atoms in the model.
Denition 18 If L is a language and A = hD;Ri is a nominal L-model,
then the denotation function in A , in symbols, DenA = denD.
The following metatheorem indicates some of the useful features of the
denotation function. Part (4) is the semantic analogue of the axiom of ex-
tensionality in the object language, which, as already noted, is valid in this
semantics.
Metatheorem 1: If A = hD;Ri is a nominal model, then
(1) if d1; d2 2 D+, then DenA(d1) = DenA(d2) i¤ d1 = d2;
(2) if X; Y  D+ and X; Y =2 D, then DenA(X) = DenA(Y ) i¤X = Y ;
(3) if d1 2 D; d2 2 D+ and for all d3 2 D+ [there is an X  D+ such that
d3 2 X & DenA(d2) = DenA(X) only if there is a Y  D+ such that d3 2 Y
& DenA(d1) = DenA(Y )], then d1 = d2.
(4) if d1; d2 2 D+: if for all d3 2 D+, (there is an X  D+ such that
d3 2 X & DenA(d1) = DenA(X) i¤ there is an Y  D+ such that d3 2 Y &
DenA(d2) = DenA(Y )), then d1 = d2.
An assignment in a model of values to variables assigns objects in the
union of the domain of atoms and the non-empty, nonsingleton subsets of that
domain to the individual variables and subsets of the latter to the nominal
variables.
Denition 19 If A = hD;Ri is a nominal L-model, then a is an assignment
(of values to variables) in A i¤ a is a function with the set of individual and
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nominal variables as domain and such that
(1) for each individual variable x, a(x) 2 D0, for some D0  D+, and
(2) for each nominal variable A, a(A)  D+.
Thus, an assignment in a nominal model assigns values to the individual
variables that are drawn from a set D0 that contains D+, i.e., D+  D0, and
it assigns to the nominal variables subsets of D+. The distinction between
D+and D0 is required for the free logicaspect of the rst-order part of the
logic of classes as many; that is, D+ is the set of values of bound individual
variables and D0 is the set of values of free individual variables.
We next inductively dene the extension of a name or formula in a model.
Denition 20 If L is a language, A = hD;Ri is a nominal L-model, a is an
assignment in A, and  is a name or formula of L, then the extension of 
in A relative to a and an individual variable z (as place holder), in symbols
ext(;A; a; z); is dened recursively as follows:
(1) if  is a nominal variable or constant in L, then
ext(;A; a; z) =

R(); if  is a constant in L
a(); if  is a nominal or individual variable
;
(2) if  is an identity formula (a = b), where a; b are singular terms, i.e.,
either individual variables, nominal variables or constants in L, or names of
L of the form [x^B], then
ext(;A; a; z) =

1; if DenA(ext(a;A; a; z)) = DenA(ext(b;A; a; z))
0 otherwise
;
(3) If  is a 2 b, for some singular terms a; b of L, then ext(;A; a; z) = 1 if
for someX  D+, ext(a;A; a; z) 2 X &DenA(b) = DenA(X); and otherwise
ext(;A; a; z) = 0;
(4) If  is a  b, for some singular terms a; b of L, then ext(;A; a; z) = 1 if
for all d 2 D+, there is an X  D+ such that d 2 X & DenA(a) = DenA(X)
only if there is a Y  D+ such that d 2 Y and DenA(b) = DenA(Y ); and
otherwise ext(;A; a; z) = 0;
(5) If  is a  b, for some singular terms a; b of L, then ext(;A; a; z) = 1 if
for all d 2 D+, there is an X  D+ such that d 2 X & DenA(a) = DenA(X)
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only if there is a Y  D+ such that d 2 Y and DenA(b) = DenA(Y ), and yet
it is not the case that for all d 2 D+, there is an Y  D+ such that d 2 Y
& DenA(b) = DenA(Y ), only if there is an X  D+ such that d 2 X and
DenA(a) = DenA(X);
(6) if  is (a1; :::; an), for some n-place predicate constant in L, then
extA(;A; a; z) = 1 if hDenA(extA(a1;A; a; z); :::; DenA(extA(an;A; a; z))i 2
R(); and otherwise extA(;A; a; z) = 0;
(7) if  is Atom, then ext(;A; a; z) = D;
(8) if  is :', for some formula ' of L, then
ext(;A; a; z) =

1, if ext(';A; a; z) = 0
0, otherwise
;
(9) if  is ('!  ); for some formulas ';  of L, then
ext(;A; a; z) =

0, if ext(';A; a; z) = 1 and ext( ;A; a; z) = 0
1, otherwise
;
(10) if  is (8x)', for some formula ' of L and individual variable x, then
ext(;A; a; z) =

1 if for all d 2 D+, ext(';A; a(d=x); z) = 1
0, otherwise
;
(11) if  is (8xB)', for some formula ' of L, individual variable x, and
name B, then (note the change in place-holder) ext(;A; a; z) = 1, if for
all d 2 D+ \ ext(B;A; a(d=x); x), ext(';A; a(d=x); x) = 1; and otherwise
ext(;A; a; z) = 0;
(12) if  is (8C'), for some formula ' of L and nominal variable C, then
ext(;A; a; z) =

1, if for all X  D+, ext(';A; a(X=C); z) = 1
0, otherwise
;
(13) if  is B=', for some name B and formula ' of L, then ext(;A; a; z) =
fd 2 D+ : d 2 ext(B;A; a(d=z); z) & ext(';A; a(d=z); z) = 1g;
(14) if  is =', for some formula ' of L, then ext(;A; a; z) = fd 2 D+ :
d 2 ext(';A; a(d=z); z) = 1g; and
(15) if  is [x^B], for some individual variable x and name B of L, then
ext(;A; a; z) = fd 2 D+ : d 2 ext(B;A; a(d=x); z)g.
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Note that in the deniens of clause 11 of this denition the place-holder
variable z is replaced by the variable x. Also, although the place-holder
in the deniens remains unchanged in clauses 13 and 14, the assignment is
modied with respect to that place-holder. In clause 15, the place-holder
is left unchanged and the assignment is modied with respect to the bound
variable.
Denition 21 If L is a language, ' is a formula of L, A is a nominal L-
model and a is an assignment in A, then
(1) a satises ' in A i¤ ext(';A; a; z) = 1, for some individual variable z
(as place-holder); and
(2) ' is true in A i¤ every assignment in A satises ' in A.
We dene logical consequence and validity in the usual way.
Denition 22 If L is a language and  [f'g is a set of formulas of L, then
(1) ' is a logical consequence of  , in symbols,   j= ', i¤ for every L-model
A and every assignment a in A, if a satises every formula in   in A, then
a satises ' in A; and
(2) ' is valid if it is a logical consequence of the empty set.
The following soundness theorem leads directly to a consistency proof for
the logic of classes as many plus the axiom of extensionality.
Metatheorem 2: (Soundness) If ' is a theorem of the logic of classes
as many plus the axiom of extensionality, then ' is valid with respect to the
above semantics.
The consistency of the logic of classes as many (plus the axiom of ex-
tensionality) follows from the fact that fhn; !i : n 2 !g is a set of atoms
and therefore that hfhn; !i : n 2 !g+; 0i is a nominal model, and hence that
every theorem is true in hfhn; !i : n 2 !g+; 0i.
Metatheorem 3: The logic of classes as many with the axiom of exten-
sionality added is consistent.
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9 Appendix 2: Bells System M 48
The systemM of classes as many in [Bell 2000] is di¤erent from the logic de-
scribed here. M is designed to show how proper (or ultimate) classes, which
do not belong to other classes, can be taken to be classes as many (though
Bell takes all sets to be classes as many and redenes setin terms of certain
individuals identied as labeledclasses). Unlike the logic described here,
M is not designed to provide a semantics for plural references in natural lan-
guage, and it is not clear how one might use it for that purpose. Nevertheless,
Bells systemM can be translated into the logic of classes as many presented
here with the result that, with the axiom of extensionality added to the latter,
the translation of each axiom of M is a theorem of our present system (and
hence that M is contained in the latter). M is a two-sorted rst-order logic
with capital letters, A;B;C; etc., for classes as many and lower-case letters
x; y; z; etc., as individual variables. The logic of classes as many described
here contains a two-sorted rst-order (free) logic as a proper part, where the
capital letters A;B;C; etc. for nominal concepts are nominalized and trans-
formed into singular terms for classes as many. As primitive symbols,M also
contains 2 for the membership relation, the identity sign (applied to classes
terms or to individual terms separately), a labeling functor  (applied to
class terms), a co-labeling functor  (applied to individual terms), a monadic
predicate I (applied to individual terms, where I(a) is read a is an identi-
er), a monadic predicate S (applied to class terms, where S(A) is read A is
a set), and the abstraction operator, fx : '(x)g (read as the class dened by
'). Our translation function  identies the capital and individual variables
of M with the same letters in our logic of classes as many and interprets
the labeling function  as the nominalization of a nominal expression A, i.e.,
(A) = A (nominalized). Membership in M is identied with membership
in the logic of classes as many and class abstracts are similarly identied with
one another We extend  so that, in addition to the correlation of the terms
of M with singular terms of our logic of classes as many, each formula of M
is translated into a formula of the logic of classes as many described here,
with the translation of the co-labeling functor  given contextually, i.e., for
formulas such as '(x) in which it occurs:
48After this paper was written and submitted for publication, another formulation for
classes as many (but only in the context of set theory) was published in [Bell 2000]. This
appendix was added to briey explain the connection between that formulation and the
one given here.
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1. (x) = x and (A) = A, for each individual variable x and nominal
variable A;
2. (a) = (a), where a is a class term of M (other than of the form b);
3. (fx : '(x)g) = [x^=('(x))];
4. (a 2 b) = ((a) 2 (b));
5. (a = b) = (a = b), where a; b are either both class terms of M or both
terms for individuals;
6. (I(a)) = (9z)((a) = z), where z is the rst individual variable not
occurring in a;
7. (S(a)) = (9z)((a) = z);
8. ('(a)) = (9A)[(a) = A^ ('(A=a))], where a is a term of M for an
individual and A is a class variable of M that is free for a in ';
9. (:') = :('); and ('!  ) = [(')! ( )];
10. (8x') = (8x)('); and (8A') = (8A)(')
The translation of the axiom of extensionality of M is just a version of
the axiom of extensionality in the present logic of classes as many. Also, the
translation of each labeling axiomofM is an obvious theorem of our logic:
(S(A)$ I(A)) = [(9z)(A = z)$ (9z)(A = x)];
(I(x)$ S(x)) = [(9z)(x = z)$ (9A)[x = A ^ (9z)(A = z)]];
(S(B))! (B) = B) = [(9z)(B = z)! (9A)[B = A ^ A = B]];
(I(x)! (x) = x) = [(9z)(x = z)! (9A)[x = A ^ A = x]]:
And nally the axiom of comprehension ofM is also translated into a theorem
of our logic:
(y 2 fx : '(x)g $ '(y=x)) = [(9z[x^=('(x))])(y = z)$ ('(y=x))]:
As noted, the labeling function of M that associates each class with a
labeled individual corresponds to the nominalization transformation of our
present logic of classes as many, and those cases where the labeled individuals
are sets(as dened in M) correspond to those where a nominal concept is




[1] Aczel, Peter, 1988, Non-Well-Founded Sets, CSLI, Stanford.
[2] Bell, John L., 2000, Sets and Classes as Many,Journal of Philosophical
Logic 29, no. 6: 585601.
[3] Boolos, 1984, To Be Is To Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some
Values of Some Variables), The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXI,
no. 8: 430449.
[4] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1977, Sortals, Natural Kinds and Re-
identication,Logique et Analyse 80: 439474.
[5] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1987, Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philoso-
phy, Ohio State University Press, Columbus.
[6] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1989, Conceptualism, Realism, and Intensional
Logic,Topoi, vol. 7, no. 1 (1989): 1534.
[7] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1996, Conceptual Realism as a Formal Ontol-
ogy,in Formal Ontology, Poli, R. and P.M. Simons, eds., Kluwer Aca-
demic Press, Dordrecht: 2760.
[8] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1998, Reference in Conceptual Realism,Syn-
these, vol. 114, no. 2: 169202.
[9] Cocchiarella, Nino B., 2001,A conceptualist Interpretation of
Lesniewskis Ontology,History and Philosophy of Logic, vol.
[10] Freund, Max, 2001, A Temporal Logic for Sortals,Studia Logica vol.
[11] Geach, Peter T., 1980, Reference and Generality, third edition, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London.
[12] Goodman, Nelson, 1956, A World of Individuals, in The Problem of
Universals, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.
[13] Holmes, M. Randall, 1998, Elementary Set Theory with a Universal Set,
Cahiers Du Centre De Logique, Bruylant-Academia, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium.
37
[14] Quine, Willard V.O., 1974, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La
Salle, Ill.
[15] Russell, Bertrand, 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, second edition,
Norton & Co., N.Y., 1938.
[16] Russell, Bertrand, 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy,
George Allen & Unwin, LTD., London.
[17] Schein, Barry, 1993, Plurals and Events, MIT Press, Cambridge.
[18] Sellars, Wilfrid F., 1963, Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontol-
ogy,reprinted in Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London.
[19] Simons, Peter M., 1982, Plural Reference and Set Theory, in Parts
and Moments, Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Barry Smith, ed.,
Philosophia Verlag, Munich and Vienna: 199260.
38
